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Invest in more business education for PMs, and reap returns in the short term—good products at an
appropriate price—and long—repaired credibility for defense acquisition.
by Robert F. Mortlock, Col., USA (Ret.)
“I don’t care how much it costs, we need it now!”
At the height of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, getting the warfighter the capabilities they needed as rapidly as
possible was always the top priority for the defense acquisition community—and who could argue against it?
Delivering effective, suitable warfighting equipment as fast as possible was the focus—often at the long-term expense,
literally, of the services’ and DOD’s budgets.
Maintaining the focus on urgent needs was possible because of the availability and amount of overseas contingency
operations funding. Speed of delivery was a higher priority than total ownership or life cycle costs, despite the
significant impact it had on long-term operation and maintenance accounts. Fast-forward a few years, and the
services faced declining base budgets, sequestration and the first of three iterations of the Better Buying Power
initiative, emphasizing the importance of making wise financial investments with limits on planned funding.
It was a dual reality: one in which money was no object and one in which money was the overriding concern. You just
had to remember in which reality you were operating, or you could find yourself burned. This dilemma of the past
decade will continue well into the future for many acquisition program managers (PMs).
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DRESS FOR SUCCESS
Spc. Saurav Udas, a supply specialist assigned to the 3rd BCT, 25th ID, holds new Operation Camouflage Pattern to be used in the tropical environments in the Pacific
region. A program’s schedule—how quickly the Army wants to get gear in the hands of Soldiers—requires considering return on investment. (U.S. Army photo by Staff
Sgt. Armando R. Limon, 3rd BCT, 25th ID)
The good news is that the training and education of acquisition PMs, and of the Defense Acquisition Workforce in
general, has never been better. PMs have gained defense acquisition and procurement acumen based on both
education and experience. PMs and program executive officers (PEOs) have defined criteria for education, training
and experience, with certification requirements that ensure their pedigree to lead organizations and programs. But just
as conditions and priorities change, the demands for acquisition knowledge do, too. There needs to be a continual
review of PMs’ education requirements to ensure that they have the tools necessary to lead ever more complex DOD
programs in challenging fiscal environments. Today’s emphasis on affordability will only grow more important with the
continuing uncertainty of funding, requiring that PMs have formal business education.
In my 17-plus years in this profession, the command climate of every program management office I was part of
centered on getting solutions to the warfighter as quickly as possible that would meet their needs affordably and be
supportable. The competence and leadership of PMs has been exemplary, yet defense acquisition is in a continual
state of “reform” as the result of a relatively small number of very high-profile failed acquisition efforts. One acquisition
reform that would pay big dividends without adding bureaucracy or oversight would be to require more fundamental
business education for PMs—defense acquisition is, after all, fundamentally a business endeavor. Acquisition attracts
mission-driven professionals who want to apply business skills to saving the lives of Soldiers, as the Hon. Heidi Shyu
noted when she was the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology.
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DRONE TRACKING
Soldiers from 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2 CR) field artillery squadron conduct new equipment training on the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Mobile Integrated
Capability, Feb. 27-March 30 at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Rose Barracks, Germany. Proposals for new equipment face declining budgets and sequestration. (Photo
by Sgt. Devon Bistarkey, 2 CR Public Affairs)
FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS—OR NOT
Defense acquisition as an institution—commonly referred to as “big A” acquisition—comprises the three decision
support templates used to guide programs: one for generating requirements, known as the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System; a second for managing program milestones, known as the Defense Acquisition
Management System (commonly referred to as “little A”); and a third for allocating resources, as the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution process. The “big A” fails, despite PMs’ best efforts, because of the
complexity of the interactions among the requirements, funding and management systems as well as the effects of
competing stakeholder priorities.
Within this framework, the specific causes of most program failures are easy to identify: changing requirements,
unstable funding, immature technologies, misalignment of requirements and funding, competing political agendas,
schedule-driven programs overemphasizing milestone achievement, the rapid pace of change and innovation in
technology and the rapidly evolving threat environment against the backdrop of a deliberate acquisition system.
More business-savvy PMs could more easily make financially astute recommendations even with the continuing fiscal
challenges and constantly changing environments. Requiring that PMs receive more fundamental business education
would simply double down on the professionalism of the acquisition workforce, not add a new layer of government.
Currently, Level III certification in program management, as dictated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act, requires 24 business credit hours—without specifics on the types of required courses. The
requirement is an acknowledgment of the importance of formal business education for PMs and is a fundamentally
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critical step in establishing PMs as acquisition professionals, but DOD should go further: Increase the PM selection
requirement to having an accredited business degree (preferably a business master’s degree or MBA with a defense
acquisition management concentration and a focus on system engineering and technology management) for all
product and program managers at the O-5 and O-6 levels. And don’t limit the increased requirement to acquisition
category (ACAT) I PMs (those who manage the biggest programs)—all PMs need a solid base in business and
financial education. Promotion to field-grade officer rank above O-4 (corresponding roughly to the time an officer would
be seeking Level III PM certification) already requires a graduate degree; therefore, this recommendation doesn’t
present the Army with an additional education cost.
A BUSINESS CASE IN POINT
The recent adoption of the Army Physical Fitness Uniform (APFU) offers an excellent example of an effort that
required a financially responsible acquisition approach. In early 2012, more than 76,000 Soldiers expressed
dissatisfaction with the Army’s physical fitness uniform in an online survey, primarily noting stiff, uncomfortable fabrics
and a lack of female sizes. As a result, Army leadership directed PEO Soldier to update the physical fitness uniform
with higher-performing fabrics, new sizes and a new design to address Soldier dissatisfaction and the expanded use of
the uniform in combat zones.
UNIFORMLY SOUND BUSINESS
Numerous complaints about the Improved Physical Fitness Uniform then in use led the Army to adopt a new Army Physical Fitness Uniform, which used upgraded
materials and fit better. Sound business principles and cost analysis led to a decision to phase in the new APFU gradually. (Image courtesy of PEO Soldier and U.S.
Army Acquisition Support Center)
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After prototype testing with Soldiers, a series of town halls across Army installations hosted by the sergeant major of
the Army, and another online survey with approximately 190,000 participating Soldiers, Army leadership approved the
APFU in April 2013 with more than 30 improvements, from better sizing (including sizes designed for women) to a
change to moisture-wicking fabrics. The Army approved a plan to phase the uniform in over four and a half years,
allowing Soldiers to wear the APFU beginning in October 2014 with a mandatory possession date of October 2017.
The plan took into account user testing with Soldiers in representative climatic conditions at six Army installations;
technical testing for durability, colorfastness, laundering, moisture wicking, female sizing and fit; time to subsequently
optimize the design; time to put the uniform on contract with multiple vendors; time to build up production inventories,
and finally time for Soldiers to transition to the APFU.
Repeatedly, senior-level decision reviews at the Pentagon posed the following questions:
Why can’t the Army just give Soldiers commercial (for example, Nike or UnderArmour) workout gear?
Why can’t the transition happen faster (begin sooner and take less than three years)?
The increase in the price is less than $1—let’s just buy the slightly more expensive one—what’s the big deal?
Answering these questions requires understanding return on investment (ROI)—fundamental principles taught in
business education curriculums and then subsequently applied in practice, which results in experience. To start with,
providing Soldiers commercial products would require the Army to purchase the technical data rights, at a cost of tens
of millions of dollars, or pay a per-unit premium in the form of a 10-20 percent markup per item. Both of these options
have bad ROI when the Army could upgrade to similar fabrics and design and avoid the commercial product premium.
The program schedule—how quickly the Army wants to get gear in the hands of Soldiers—also necessitates
considering ROI, because project timelines are proportional to required resources. In the APFU case, for the Army to
rapidly replace all current fitness uniforms would not only mean an upfront bill for the cost of the new uniforms but also
would require that the Army account for the costs of on-hand inventories (quantities of the current physical fitness
uniforms bought, stored and ready for Soldier issue when needed) on the order of tens of millions of dollars at any
given time. The adoption of a phased implementation strategy, whereby the Army would use on-hand inventory and
gradually convert new buys to the APFU, allows the Army to build up APFU inventory for a phased adoption integration
by the force, draws down the current inventory and avoids a large residual asset bill (quantities of the current fitness
uniforms that the Army no longer needs).
Finally, the price per unit is important: Any seemingly small increase in price is magnified to millions of dollars because
of the number of Soldiers, basis of issue (in this case, the number of APFUs allotted to each Soldier) and wear-out
time. While the cost of the APFU short-sleeved T-shirt was only $5.55, a $1 increase in a T-shirt equates to a
multimillion-dollar bill to Army personnel funding accounts at a time of great pressure on end strength. For example,
that $1 increase equates to a nearly $8 million yearly increase in future funding requirements for the personnel
account. Thus, any change in the fitness uniform had to be as close to cost-neutral as possible, based on unit price.
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CHARIOTS OF VIGOR
Soldiers assigned to 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 25th Infantry Division, (ID) perform endurance and mobility training March 13 at Watts Field on Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii. The Soldiers participated in a weeklong advanced physical training course. In 2012, after negative input from a Soldier online survey on the Army
physical fitness uniform, the Army updated the attire with a new design, material and more sizes to address the concerns. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Armando R.
Limon, 3rd BCT, 25th ID)
CONCLUSION
The Army’s decision to gradually phase in the APFU for the existing uniform using upgraded materials in a cost-
conscious way highlights the use of sound business principles and analysis. The approach chosen for APFU
acquisition and implementation was successful in part because the PM and key members of the PM team had the
proper business education—something provided only by a formal accredited business degree, not just 24 business
credit hours.
Furthermore, the number of credit hours is not the important part of PM certification. What’s important is the
recognition that business education is a fundamental and essential professional requirement for PMs. To ensure
consistent application of this standard across the PM career field, the minimum Level III PM certification requirements
should change from 24 business credit hours to an accredited business degree.
The Army’s adoption of the APFU was not an ACAT I program with an acquisition program baseline controlling the
PM’s actions from a performance, cost and schedule standpoint. In fact, the APFU program was not a program of
record at all—it was just an effort, albeit one with high Soldier interest and oversight from top Army leaders. In this
program and hundreds of similar programs, PMs must simply do the right thing without formal approval for Soldiers
and the Army—deliver an affordable capability with the required performance within schedule constraints.
Developing and implementing fiscally responsible acquisition approaches builds and cements trust with senior
leaders, Congress and the American public: This is a PM’s fiduciary responsibility. Having PMs with the necessary
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business education, background and experience to carry out this responsibility with consistent success would have a
high ROI for DOD. It would pay dividends in the form of even more financially astute, business-savvy, cost-conscious
PMs with the acumen required to operate in an environment of budget uncertainty and increased emphasis on
improved procurement returns with limited resources.
Over time, the credibility of the acquisition profession could soar—and that is the highest possible ROI for DOD.
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of the Armed Forces and a B.S. in chemical engineering from Lehigh University. He is also a recent graduate from the
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This article is scheduled to be published in the July-September 2017 issue of Army AL&T Magazine .
Subscribe to Army AL&T News, the premier online news source for the Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology (AL&T) Workforce.
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